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TO RENEW-THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Insurance operates on the principle that a small contribution from each
member of a group will produce a fund large enough to protect the few
members who actually suffer harm.' To determine the size of the contribution,
insurance rating bureaus solicit data from all insurance companies in all
states. The data are used to develop appropriate classes of insureds and, based
on past experience, the probability that the claims paid out for these insureds
will exceed the premiums collected. These norms provide the structure on
which the rating bureaus classify risks, set premiums, and develop standard
provisions for policies for member or subscriber companies? The premium
rate is not determined by the risk presented by an individual insured. Instead,
the premiums are determined by the average risk presented by members of
a class of insureds, each of whom has essentially the same probability that
he will be involved in an accident. 3 In this way, the insurance company is
guaranteed an adequate, yet not excessive, premium to be collected from
each class of insureds.
Under this method of collecting statistics and establishing rates, mem-
bers of a class of insureds, which class presents a greater risk to the company,
will pay higher premiums than members of a class presenting a lower risk.
Of course, each individual paying the same premium does not objectively, as
an individual, necessarily present the same risk to the company. As men-
tioned, the rates are averages and within each classification there will be
individuals who present risks both greater and less than the average. Na-
turally, within each classification attempts are made to maintain as much
uniformity of risk as possible,4 but the breadth of the sampling required to
make the general classifications reliable necessarily results in some degree
of variance of risk.
Insurance companies can afford to write insurance for insureds present-
ing greater than average risks because the companies also write insurance for
less than average risks. When measured against the total volume of business
the company writes, insuring some persons for a premium not exactly com-
mensurate with the risk presented may still be financially sound business.
The insurance industry has felt, however, that a particular insured is not
desirable if he presents an unusually high risk not commensurate with the
applicable premium rate. In fact, competition between insurance companies
arises from attempts to insure only the minimum risks within each classifica-
tion. To this end, each company has distinct underwriting policies, based on
statistics supplied by the insurance rating bureaus. The underwriting policies
1 H.R. Rep. No. 815, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1967).
2 H. Zoffer, The History of Automobile Liability Insurance Rating 72-73 (1959).
8 Kulp, The Rate-Making Process in Property and Casualty Insurance—Goals,
Technics, and Limits, 15 Law & Contemp. Prob. 493, 496 (1950).
4 See id. at 495.
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determine how the best risks are selected by forming subclasses within each
classification. To implement underwriting policies, companies circulate direc-
tives and manuals to their underwriters, brokers and agents who determine
whether to accept, cancel or renew a particular risk. 5
The application of underwriting policies to decisions not to accept a
risk or to terminate coverage of an insured, has become a source of great
public dissatisfaction. Recently, much of the dissatisfaction has centered on
mid-term cancellations and refusals to renew. 5 Instances of termination—
either cancellation or refusal to renew—have allegedly occurred due to facts
which did not warrant the company's action. Examples of such instances
include: (1) after the insured has made a claim against the company,? (2)
after an accident with no claim,5 (3) after an insured's car was struck from
the rear by another automobile,° and (4) after the insured's car was hit while
parked." In these situations the attack may be made that the company is
basing its action on personal judgment rather than underwriting statistics.' -'
Industry representatives have considered the charges of arbitrariness
to be unfounded. They argue that their companies are in business to make
a profit and, as a result, economic reasons alone determine whether a policy
is to be terminated. It is simply not good business to terminate a policy
without a statistical basis to support the decision. Thus, when policies are
terminated, insurance companies insist that the reason is not that an arbi-
trary judgment has been made, but is that the statistics dictate that the finan-
cial risk has become so great that it can no longer be accepted.
Insurance company representatives contend that a company will not
have occasion to review the acceptability of a risk, unless the insured is
brought to the attention of the company's underwriting department by a
record of claims or motor vehicle violations, or unless the company feels that
the premium rates are inadequate so that its underwriting policies must
become more restrictive." Recently, economic demands have caused insur-
ance companies to scrutinize both of these factors very carefully." Costs
of operation have sky-rocketed.' 4 The number of profitable risks in each
classification has become smaller, and the competition to insure them more
intense. As a result, companies are less likely to insure and quicker to term-
inate less favorable risks.
5 H.R. Rep. No. 815, supra note 1, at '133.
See Joint Interim Committee on Insurance, Report to the Washington State
Legislature 12 (1966).
7 H.R. Rep. No. 815, supra note 1, at 86.
8 Id. at 80-81.
9 Id. at 85.
to Id.
11 Id. at 87.
12 National Ass'n of Independent Insurers, Let's Look at the Record 24 (undated
pamphlet) [hereinafter cited as The Record].
13 See Ind. Ins. Dep't, Bull. No. 21, Aug. 22, 1966.
14 Hospital daily service charges in the United States have risen 354% in the last
20 years; traffic accident deaths and injuries are increasing 58% faster than motor
vehicle registrations; jury awards for serious personal injuries are rising at an annual
rate of 13.6%; physicians' fees have gone up 38.6% in ten years; automobile repair costs
have increased by almost 50% in the last ten years. See The Record, supra note 12, at 4-5.
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In theory, the position of the insurance companies is reasonable, but in
application it loses some of its force. No doubt companies have statistics
showing that insureds in seemingly arbitrary subclasses, e.g., military per-
sonnel and divorcees, have actually had more accidents. Also, there is no
doubt that the companies can, at least in a general way, explain these
results. 15
 Yet, underwriting policies and statistics must be applied to the
circumstances of the individual case. The local company underwriter must
assess all statistics in determining whether the degree of risk presented
warrants cancellation or nonrenewal of a policy. In all but the most obvious
cases, a decision requires balancing a number of factors, a process which
necessarily involves the personal judgment of the underwriter.i°
Since personal judgment is involved, however, the process may become
arbitrary. A number of companies have admitted that their classifications
"were not based on precise statistical background." 17 In addition, information
relied on by the underwriter may be unreliable or inaccurate. The method
used to develop classes and subclasses, though the only one available, is often
unsatisfactory. Too great a refinement in subclasses of risks may tend to
make the averages statistically unreliable. 18
 Even though experience indicates
a loss propensity for a given subclass, it may be merely coincidental. In this
case, use of subclasses may single out certain groups for special treatment
while other persons with similar characteristics are not singled out. Divorcees
may have common patterns of behavior that produce a higher possibility
of accidents,19 but these patterns are shared with millions of others who are
not susceptible of statistical classification and, as a result, are not penalized.
15 One company suggests that temporary military personnel he examined closely
because:
"(1) Many of these risks are "minor operations"....
(2) The automobiles are used almost entirely for relaxation and pleasure
during off-duty hours.
(3) Passes, furloughs, or leaves of short duration are often utilized for
quick trips to the homes of relatives and friends. Such trips frequently involve
almost continuous operation, excessive speed, driving over unfamiliar roads,
and relief driving by fellow servicemen.
(4) The loaning of automobiles to others is more common than with the
nonmilitary risk...
(5) Lack of proper maintenance due to limited finances results in increased
physical hazards.
(6) The frequent reassignment of Armed Forces personnel may prevent
an insured from cooperating in claim handling."
H.R. Rep. No. 815, supra note 1, at 133. For the reasons of a different company, see
id. at 84.
Another seemingly arbitrary category is that of divorced women. One company,
however, advanced the following justification for use of that criterion. "OA ivorce can be a
highly emotional and traumatic experience and the transition from married life carries
new pressures and responsibilities. Many adjustments must be made in personal and
social activities which have a direct bearing on the use of the automobile." Id. at 142.
18 Id. at 85.
17 See id. at 133.
18 H. Zoffer, supra note 2, at 4.
19 One insurance company instructs its underwriters that divorced women should
be given special attention because of the "[plossibility of emotional instability and
personality factors adversely affecting driving ability and accident potential." H.R. Rep.
No. 815, supra note 1, at 145. See also id. at 142.
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Even assuming that the classifications are statistically reliable, possi-
bility of error exists in the fact-finding process used to determine which
classifications apply to a particular risk. Insurance companies use the services
of independent investigators to verify information on insurance applications
and to collect continuing information on the risks and classes." These in-
vestigators may be hired on a piecemeal basis for as low as 75 cents for each
report," and their desire to increase output may result "in less than thorough
verification of the facts reported." 22 Underwriters may base decisions to
terminate on the investigator's erroneous information, thus, damaging inno-
cent policyholders.
If the inconvenience of having to obtain insurance elsewhere were the
only result of an arbitrary cancellation or refusal to renew, it might be
tolerated. This is not the case, however. Once cancelled, the insured may have
difficulty securing insurance, for there is an insurance industry practice not
to insure persons who have been previously cancelled, 23 or to do so only at
higher premiums."
As a result, the insured may be forced to obtain insurance either through
a state assigned-risk program, designed to afford minimum coverage to large
numbers of undesired risks, or from a "high risk" company. Assuming a
person is eligible for assigned-risk coverage, this form of protection entails
a, number of disadvantages." Insurance companies are required to accept
their proportionate share of assigned-risk policies as an incident to writing
business within the state. Because of the high risk involved, however, the
companies are allowed to charge higher premiums." Also, assigned-risk
policies may apply only to personal injury liability insurance, 27
 and may be
limited to a statutory minimum amount. Finally, since an assigned risk
does not occupy a preferred position, a company may be prone to cancel an
20 See id. at 92.
21 Joint Interim Committee on Insurance, Report to the Washington State Legis-
lature 14 (1966).
22 H.R. Rep. No. 815, supra note 1, at 92.
23 Id. at 76, 155. The practice may be based on either the sole fact that another
company has cancelled, see Pruitt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 92 In. App. 2d 236, 234 N.E.2d
576, 577 (1968), or for the same reasons that led the other company to cancel. This has
severe implications in Massachusetts, New York and North Carolina where liability
insurance is compulsory and without it an individual may not drive. Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 90, § 34J (Supp. 1968) ; N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 312 (McKinney Supp. 1967) ;
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-309 (1965).
24 Companies may charge up to 150% above standard rates for minimum coverage,
Time, Jan. 26, 1968, at 21. An oddity in the premium structure may compound the
problem of financial loss by cancellation. In Massachusetts, for example, the rate structure
promulgated by the Massachusetts Commissioner of Insurance created a penalty for
mid-year purchase. Thus, "a motorist buying insurance in September pays 60 per cent
of the yearly premium though his policy covers only one third of a year since it expires
on December 31 (as all compulsory liability policies do in Massachusetts)." R. Keeton
& J. O'Connell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim 82 (1965).
25 R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, supra note 24, at 79.
26 H.R. Rep. No. 815, supra note 1, at 19.
27 As, for example, in Massachusetts, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175 § 113H (1958),
referring to id. ch. 90, § 34A (Supp. 1968).
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assigned-risk policyholder for any discoverable reason, or be likely to treat
his claims less favorably. 28
In those states where a prior cancellation makes the insured ineligible for
assigned-risk protection," and in those situations where the insured desires
coverage beyond the statutory minimum, he must go to a "high risk" com-
pany and pay larger premiums. In addition, during the past six years 73
of these companies have gone into receivership," leaving their policyholders
and persons with claims against their policyholders without effective recourse.
This problem is of such proportions that legislation has been introduced in
both the United States Senate and House 31
 to establish a Federal Motor
Vehicle Insurance Guaranty Corporation to give consumers more protection
in this area.
The common law is not sufficient to protect insureds from these severe
consequences of cancellations. At common law insurance companies have
broad rights to cancel," as long as they include in the policy a provision
giving them this power. 33
 As a result, it has become customary for companies
to insert a provision allowing cancellation at will."
The insurance industry itself has taken steps to prevent cancellation
and nonrenewal abuses. As early as 1962, insurance rating bureaus limited
the number of reasons for which insurance companies could cancel automobile
bodily injury and property damage insurance policies. 35 Subsequently, the
policies of most companies contained provisions limiting their cancellation
rights." In 1968, the bureaus further reduced the reasons justifying can-
cellation, retaining only the following: (1) nonpayment of premiums and (2)
suspension or revocation of driver's license or motor vehicle registration. 37
In addition, they applied this cancellation protection to comprehensive, col-
lision, medical payments and uninsured motorists policies. 38
 The 1968 pro-
gram also encompasses renewals of original policies that were written for
less than a one-year period." Finally, individual insurance companies have
independently and voluntarily restricted their right to cancel or refuse to
renew, for example, by guaranteeing not to cancel or refuse renewal for
28 R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, supra note 24, at 79.
29 For example, in Massachusetts he would be ineligible for subsequent assigned-risk
protection for 12 months after a cancellation, R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, supra note 24,
at 78.
no H.R. Rep. No. 815, supra note 1, at 67.
31 See id.
32 Id. at 153.
33 See Horton v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 208 Ark. 772, 187 S.W.2d 544 (1945).
34 See Datz v. Union Hill Hudson Corp., 12 N.J. Misc. 807, 175 A. 182 (Sup. Ct.
1934.)
85
 National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, Endorsement A 799 Family Amend-
atory Endorsement, effective Jan. 1, 1963, at Conditions 3.
36
 H.R. Rep. No. 815, supra note 1, at 153.
37 Insurance Rating Board, Endorsement A895 Family Amendatory Endorsement,
effective Jan. 1, 1968; Letter from F.O. Terbell, Ass't General Counsel, Lumberman
Mutual Casualty Company, Mar. 19, 1968.
38
 Letter from Charles A. King, Counsel, Insurance Rating Board, Apr. 15, 1968.
39 Insurance Rating Board, supra note 37.
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five years, if the premiums are paid and the insured and members of his
household retain valid drivers' licenses."
Although the response of the insurance industry as a whole has been
responsible," the abuses have not been completely eliminated by industry
self-policing. For example, the rating bureau programs do not fully correct
abuses in connection with renewals. Moreover, the rating bureau programs do
not reach all insurance companies. Independent insurers are not bound by
the rating bureau programs, 42 and members and subscribers of the bureaus
may dissent from the bureaus' programs and independently file programs
with the state insurance commissioners.43 There are indications that most of
the abuses have come from a small number of insurance companies that are
not part of the rating bureau programs."
Because of the continuance of abuses, there has been a need for some
form of state control. Until very recently, however, state regulation of the
• insurance companies' right to cancel policies or refuse renewal has been mini-
mal." Statutes have focused, almost exclusively, on requiring the companies
to give notice of intent to cancel and, in some states, intent not to renew."
40 See Allstate Insurance Company, Renewal Guarantee, effective July 1967. The
rates may, however, vary if the insured's rating classification changes.
41 Letter from Samuel B. Rogers, Chief Deputy Comm'r, Treasurer's Office, State of
Florida, Mar. 20, 1968.
42 See National Association of Independent Insurers, Statement of Policy 5 (1967).
41 H.R. Rep. No. 815, supra note 1, at 24; Insurance Information Institute, The
New Insurance Rating Board 7 (1967).
44 Robert D. Haase, Wisconsin Comm'r of Ins., Report to Wisconsin Legislative
Council 5 (1967). In Washington, six of the independent companies did not follow the
Insurance Rating Board's latest program and evidently waited for the state's recently en-
acted cancellation statute to become effective, Letter from Richard A. Hunke, Rate Analyst,
Office of Ins. Comm'r, Wash., Feb. 26, 1968.
45 Although the public interest in having adequate insurance protection has long
been recognized as a proper basis for regulation of the industry, see German Alliance
Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1913), state regulation has been minimal.
46 E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-7-25 (1964) (10 days notice to Director of
Revenue) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430 (Supp. 1967) (5 days) ; Idaho Code Ann. § 49-1522
(1967) (cancellation or termination-10 days); III. Ann. Stat. ch. 95'4, § 7-318 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1968) (10 days to Secretary of State) ; Iowa Code Ann. § 515.81 (Supp.
1968) (5 days) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 187.500 (1963) (or termination-10 days to De-
partment); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22:636.A.(1) (1959) (5 days); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 24, § 1051 (1965) (10 days for physical damage policy) ; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
29, § 787.6. (1965) (10 days for liability policy) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13020 (Supp.
1968) (10 days) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 170.41 (1960) (or termination-10 days to office of
Commissioner) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 303.210 (1963) (or termination-10 days to Director of
Revenue) ; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 53-439 (1961) (or termination-10 days to Highway
Patrol Supervisor) ; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 485.3092 (1967) (or termination-10 days) ; N.Y.
Veh. Traf. Law § 347 (McKinney 1960) (or termination-10 days to Commissioner);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.22 (1965) (or termination-20 days) ; N.D. Cent. Code § 39-16.1-
12 (Supp. 1967) (or termination-10 days to Commissioner) ; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, §
7-325 (1962) (or termination-10 days to Department); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 486.506(2)
(1963) (or termination-10 days to Department) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 75, § 1422
(1960) (or termination-10 days to Secretary) ; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 31-32-25 (Supp.
1967) (or termination-10 days to Registry) ; S.C. Code Ann. § 46-702 (7) (h) (Supp.
1967) (10 days) ; Tenn. Code Ann. § 59-1224 (Supp. 1967) (or termination-10 days to
Commissioner) ; Va. Code Ann. § 38.1-381.1 (Supp. 1968) (notice by registered or
certified mail) ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 48.18.290(1) (a) (1961) (5 days) ; W. Va. Code
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The purpose of these statutes is to provide the insured with sufficient time to
secure insurance with some other company prior to the time when his policy
is terminated.47
The statutes of Maryland and North Dakota are a variation on the
notice statutes. In addition to a notice provision, these statutes include a re-
quirement that the company, if requested, furnish the insured with the
reasons for its decision to cancel or not renew his policy."' This requirement
is based on the fact that companies are reluctant to divulge the reasons
prompting underwriting decisions, and that situations may develop where
the insured goes from company to company, only to be cancelled successively
by each company. Without knowing the basis for the first company's action,
the insured is not equipped to argue either that the company's decision was
founded on erroneous information or that the basis does not justify cancella-
tion."
The Maryland and North Dakota statutes reduce the possibility that
an applicant will make repeated futile attempts to obtain insurance and may
also reduce the number of erroneous decisions by the companies. Since the
insured must take the initiative to request the reasons, however, it is not
likely that even these limited goals will be accomplished effectively. In any
event, statutes requiring notice of cancellation and a statement of reasons
for the decision solve only a small part of the problem. Seventeen state
legislatures and four state insurance commissioners in other states 5° recog-
nized this and have passed statutes and issued regulations to limit the reasons
for which insurance companies may terminate automobile
Ann. § 17D-4-13 (1966) (or termination-10 days to Commissioner) ; Wyo. Stat. Ann. §
31-307 (1967) (or termination-10 days to Superintendent). But see Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 26, § 8A (1966), establishing in 1925 a board of appeal on motor vehicle liability
policies and bonds which has jurisdiction over liability policies regarding refusal to issue,
nonrenewal, and cancellation problems.
41 See Moore v. Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., - Ind. App. -, 234 N.E.2d 661,
663 (1968).
48 Md. Ann. Code art. 48A, § 2408 (Supp. 1967) ; N.D. Cent. Code § 26-02-34
(Supp. 1967) (nonrenewal).
99 See H.R. Rep. No. 815, supra note 1, at 92.
50 Many more states are considering similar bills. During the first eight months of
1967, 103 bills dealing with cancellation were introduced in 38 state legislatures, Letter
from Andrew C. Lynch, Attorney, Allstate Insurance Company, Mar. 11, 1968.
51 Cal. Ins. Code §§ 651-53, 660-64, 670-71 (West Supp. 1967) ; Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5,
tit. 10, art. 7.5., §§ 2370-73 (Cal. Dep't of Ins., Ruling No. 147, File No. RH-108,
Exhibit "A" at 1-5, Dec. 30, 1965) [hereinafter cited as CO. Ad. Code] ; Conn. Ad. Regs.
§§ 38-175a-1 to -8 (letter from Conn. Ins. Dep't to all companies writing insurance in
Conn., Jan. 25, 1968) [hereinafter cited as Conn. Ad. Regs.1 ; Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, §
2908 (1953) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852 (Supp. 1968) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430 (Supp.
1967) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.1 (Smith-Hurd 1965), as amended, §§ 755.2-.10
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968) ; Ind. Ins. Dep't, Bull. No. 21, Aug. 22, 1966; H. Bill No. 1116,
1967 Kan. Laws (letter from W. Fletcher Bell, Ass't Comm'r of Ins., Apr. 5, 1968)
[hereinafter cited as H. Bill No. 1116, 1967 Kan. Laws); Kan. Ins. Dep't Reg. 40-3-31
(letter from W. Fletcher Bell, supra) ; La. Ins. Dept Directive No. 8 (The Weekly
Underwriter, March 6, 1967) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann, ch. 26, § 8A (1966), ch. 175, § 113D
(Supp. 1966) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 24.13021, .13204-.13262 (Supp. 1968) ; Minn. Stat.
Ann. §§ 72A.141-.148 (Supp. 1968) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 379.202 (Supp. 1967) ; N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 20-279.22, -310 (1965), as amended, §§ 20-279.21, -279.34, -310(a), -310.2 (Supp.
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The regulatory statutes are intended to eliminate arbitrariness by
requiring that terminations of private passenger automobile insurance policies
be based on reliable underwriting standards. To insure compliance, the state's
administrative or judicial officials are given the power to review cancella-
tions.52
 In the event that the company has deviated from the statutory norms,
the cancellation may be declared ineffective. For purposes of analysis the
statutes will be examined in terms of the scope of their coverage, the allow-
able bases for termination, notice requirements, immunity provisions, and
remedies in the event the insured wishes to contest cancellation.
Neither all types of automobile insurance policies nor all types of
insureds are covered by the statutes. The statutes of the different states may,
inter alia: (1) limit the reasons for a mid-term cancellation but not for a
refusal to renew; " (2) not be applicable during the first 55 or 60 days that
the policy is in effect; 54 (3) cover personal injury liability but not property
damage liability or collision policies; 55 (4) exclude assigned-risk policies; 58
( 5 ) exclude single policies covering four or more automobiles; 57 and (6)
exclude policies covering garages, automobile sales agencies, repair shops
or service stations." The reasons for some of the exclusions, for example
policies covering automobiles used in a business, may be self-explanatory,
but the considerations behind others are somewhat complex and will be
explored in depth.
Of all the states regulating termination of policies by insurers, only
three—Massachusetts, 53 South Caroline° and Wisconsinm—have provisions
5 1967) ; R.I., Dep't of Business Reg., Div. of Ins., Regulation, Aug. 15, 1962 thereinafter
cited as R.I. Ins. Reg.] ; S.C. Code Ann. §§ 46-750.51-.54 (Supp. 1967) ; H. Bill No. 684,
1968 S.D. Laws; Va. Code Ann. §§ 38.1-70.9 to -70.13 (Supp. 1968) ; Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. §§ 48.18.42., -[3. (Supp. 1967) ; W. Va. Code Ann. §§ 33-6A-1 to -5 (Supp. 1968) ;
ch. 337, §§ 204.341-342, 1967 Wis. Laws (Wis. Leg. Serv. 1027-29 (1967)).
52 E.g., Ill. Ann. Stat, ch. 73, § 755.10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967).
53 E.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.142 (Supp. 1968).
54 E,g., Fla, Stat. Ann. § 627.0852(2) (Supp. 1968).
55 E.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175, § 113H (1958), referring to id. ch. 90, §
34A (Supp. 1968).
56 E.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(2) (Supp. 1967).
57 Conn. Ad. Regs. § 38-175a-2(1) (1968) (5 or more automobiles) ; Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 627.0852 (1) (a) (3) (b) (Supp. 1968); Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(2) (B) (b)(2) (Supp.
1967) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967) ; Ind. Ins. Dep't, Bull.
No. 21, Aug. 22, 1966; H. Bill No. 1116, § 1 (b) (2), 1967 Kan. Laws; Minn. Stat. Ann. §
72A.141 (Supp. 1967) ; R.I. Ins. Reg., Aug. 15, 1962 (5 or more automobiles) ; H. Bill.
No. 684, § 1(A), 1968 S.D. Laws; Wash. Rev. Code § 48.18-12. (Supp. 1967) ; ch. 337,
§ 204.341, 1967 Wis. Laws (Wis. Leg. Serv. 1028 (1967)).
58 Conn. Ad. Regs. § 38-175a-2 (1968) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852(1)(a) (3) (c)
(Supp. 1968) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(2) (B) (b) (3) (Supp. 1967) ; III. Ann. Stat. ch.
73, § 755.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968) ; H. Bill No. 1116, § 1(b) (3), 1967 Kan. Laws;
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.141 (Supp. 1968) ; H. Bill No. 684, § 1(A), 1968 S.D. Laws;
ch. 337, § 204.341, 1967 Wis. Laws (Wis. Leg. Serv. 1028 (1967)).
59 The Massachusetts board of appeal on motor vehicle liability policies and bonds,
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 26, § 8A (1966), has jurisdiction to determine whether a
refusal to renew is improper and unreasonable and, if so, to reinstate the policy, Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175, § 113D (Supp. 1966).
00 S.C. Code Ann. § 46-750.54 (Supp. 1967).
81 Wisconsin prohibits refusing to renew solely because of the age, residence, race,
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limiting the right of insurance companies to refuse to renew policies. The
rest of the statutes are concerned with refusal to renew only to the extent of
requiring sufficient notice of the company's intent to 'terminate. Failure to
cover nonrenewal of policies is a major deficiency in the statutes. Even if
arbitrary cancellation is entirely eliminated, companies need only wait for
the expiration of the policy term, and refuse to renew the policy. Thus, the
arbitrary personal judgments sought to be regulated can as easily be made
at the end of the policy period, probably a very short time away. 62
In an attempt to avoid this result, an addition was made to the 1965
South Carolina cancellation statute. Under the new statute, the South Caro-
lina Department of Insurance will, upon written application of the insured,
determine whether the reasons for declining to renew a policy have a "valid
and generally accepted insurance underwriting basis."
Although the inclusion of nonrenewals increases the strength of the
South Carolina statute, the nonrenewal provisions are hardly a panacea.
The South Carolina Department of Insurance has indicated that the statutory
coverage is inadequate because there are no clear standards to determine the
meaning of the phrase "valid and generally accepted underwriting basis." 63
As a result, the Insurance Law Study Committee of the South Carolina
General Assembly has recommended that the Act be amended to provide
more definite standards."
If the vagueness of the 1965 South Carolina cancellation statue is cor-
rected, it will represent a significant change in the present state of the law.
These provisions will, in many instances, impose a duty on the insurers to
reinsure policy holders year after year. This obligation is a major curtail-
ment of the insurer's ability to insist on favorable termination provisions. No
longer is the company completely free to choose the persons with whom it
will continue to deal. The fact that the obligation restricts the right of insur-
ance companies to terminate does not, however, mean that this limitation is
not justified. The cancellation statutes prevent arbitrary terminations by plac-
ing limitations on the right of the companies to terminate insurance contracts
at will. Inherent in this limitation is a legislative recognition that individual
insureds do not have sufficient bargaining position to protect themselves
from the arbitrary practices of insurance companies. The company dictates
the terms of the policy to the insured, who either accepts them or does not
obtain insurance. If extending the statutory protection to renewal situations
is necessary to accomplish the basic objectives of the cancellation provisions,
color, creed, national origin, ancestry, or occupation of anyone who is an insured. Ch. 337,
§ 204.341, 1967 Wis. Laws (Wis. Leg. Serv. 1028 (1967)).
62 To mitigate this consequence, some states have said for purposes of the cancella-
tion provisions that policies with terms of less than six months shall be deemed to run
for six months. Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2370 (1965) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. §
627.0852(1) (b) (Supp. 1968) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(2)(A) (Supp. 1967) ; III. Ann.
Stat. ch. 73, § 755.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.141 (Supp,
1968) ; H. Bill No. 684, § I (E), 1968 S.D. Laws; Wash. Rev. Code § 48.18.-[2. (Supp.
1967).





then a corresponding regulation of the bargaining process should not be an
obstacle.
It should immediately be clear that such an extension will not be a
final solution to the problems presented by termination of policies. Ultimately,
cancellation is a problem only because of the unavailability of insurance
from other companies at comparable rates. If insureds were able to obtain
insurance elsewhere, agitation for regulation of the companies would diminish.
If companies are limited in their decisions to cancel or refuse to renew, then
they will become increasingly selective in determining whom to insure in
the first place. When this occurs, public indigation will shift to criticism of
the companies for failing to issue insurance more readily.
The scope of the cancellation statutes is also limited by the types of
insurance which they cover. Except for South Dakota and Washington,° 5 the
cancellation statutes apply only to liability policies which, while including
bodily injury liability, may or may not include property damage liability."
This omission may also weaken the impact of the statutes. An insurance
company will cancel the insured's property damage liability and collision
policies at the same time as it cancels his personal injury liability policy.° 7
Yet, if the insured is successful in establishing that the company did not
comply with the statutory requirements for cancellation, his victory is limited
to the liability policy. If the cancelling company refuses to reinstate the col-
lision or property damage policies, the insured may lose this protection since
other companies may not wish to write only collision or property damage
policies. As a result, the insured may be forced to use his bodily injury
liability business as an incentive to convince another company to write
policies for his other needs." To prevent insurance companies from acquiring
an opportunity to exert leverage and, thereby, frustrating the intent of the
cancellation provisions, and to assure comprehensive protection of insureds,
the statutes would be more effective if they extended to all forms of insurance
coverage. 69
A major exclusion from the purview of the cancellation provisions is
the category of assigned-risk policies. Only seven states restrict the reasons
06 H. Bill No. 684, § 1(A), 1968 S.D. Laws; Wash. Rev. Code § 48.18.-[2. (Supp.
1967).
Whether property damage liability is included depends upon the particular state's
definition of "liability policies." E.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 95'/2 , §§ 7-317(a), (b) (Smith-
Hurd 1958) (including property damage) ; Mass. Gen. LaWs Ann. ch. 90, § 34A (1967)
(not including property damage).
67 Interview with Ralph A. Tarmac°, Executive Secretary of the Massachusetts board
of appeals on motor vehicle liability policy and bonds, in Boston, Mar. 22, 1968.
In other situations the result may be more severe. If the automobile is being financed
and is under a mortgage and the insurance company cancels property damage liability and
collision insurance, the finance company may insist that new insurance be secured, even
though this necessitates going to a "high risk" company and paying huge premiums,
Interview with Thomas F. Donahue, Chairman of Massachusetts board of appeal
on motor vehicle liability policies and bonds, in Boston, Mar. 22, 1968.
68 See H.R. Rep. No. 815, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 144 (1967).
66 The Insurance Rating Board in its latest program has extended applications to
include comprehensive, collision, medical payments, and uninsured motorists policies.
Insurance Rating Board, Endorsement A895 Family Amendatory Endorsement, effective
Jan. 1, 1968.
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for which these policies may be cancelled." The justification for this exclu-
sion is, no doubt, the comparatively high probability that an assigned-risk
insured will suffer an accident, and the belief that insurance companies should
not be forced to bear the enormous financial burden of irresponsible drivers.
On the other hand, large numbers of responsible drivers are classified as
assigned risks. Moreover, it is these insureds who most need protection since
they are the ones most likely to be cancelled and to be unable to obtain
other insurance.71
Finally, accommodation for a generally accepted practice in the insur-
ance industry has resulted in another exclusion from the provisions of the
statutes. Insurance companies write policies immediately on application, and
then conduct the underwriting investigation on the veracity of the insured's
statements and other matters the company feels relevant to assessing the
risk.72
 Generally, this practice is advantageous to the insured since it gives
him coverage immediately, eliminating the delay of an underwriting invest-
igation. Except for Wisconsin and Massachusetts, all cancellation statutes
allow for this practice by providing a 55- or 60 day "free period" during which
the insurer may cancel for any reason.73
 The purpose of the statutory excep-
tion for the first 55 or 60 days is to retain the benefit for the insured. If the
companies were limited during the initial periods to cancelling only for
statutory reasons, they would cease the practice of accepting all risks before
investigating, thus forcing applicants to wait for coverage until an investiga-
tion has been completed.74
70 Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, Rhode Island, South Carolina
and West Virginia. In the other states, assigned-risk policies are excluded by specific refer-
ence. Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit, 10, art. 7.5., § 2370 (1965) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852
(1) (a) (3) (a) (Supp. 1968) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(2) (B) (b) (1) (Supp. 1967); III.
Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968) ; Ind. Ins. Dep't, Bull. No. 21, Aug.
22, 1966; H. Bill No. 1116, § 1(b), 1967 Kan. Laws; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.141 (Supp.
1968) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 379.202(2)(5) (Supp. 1967) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-310 (1965) ;
N.D. Cent. Code § 26-02-36 (Supp. 1967) ; H. Bill No. 684, § I (A), 1968 S.D. Laws; Va.
Code Ann. § 38.1-70.12 (Supp. 1968) ; Wash. Rev. Code § 48.18.42. (Supp. 1967); ch.
337, § 204.341, /967 Wis. Laws (Wis. Leg. Serv. 1028 (1967)).
71
 In Massachusetts, for example, an assigned risk who has been cancelled is in-
eligible for subsequent assigned-risk protection for one year. Sce R. Keeton & J. O'Connell,
supra note 24, at 81.
It is significant to observe that Delaware thought the consequences of cancellation
of assigned-risk policies so serious a problem that its cancellation statute applies only
to assigned-risk policies. Del, Code Ann. tit. 21, §§ 2907, 2908 (1953).
72 Cal. Dep't of Ins., Ruling No. 147, File No. RH-108, at 4, Dec. 30, 1965.
73 Michigan is the only state with a 55-day period, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13220
(Supp. 1968). All other states have a 60-day period. Cal. Ad. Code, ch. 5, tit. 10, art.
7.5., § 2371 (1965) ; Conn. Ad. Regs. § 38-175a-8 (1968) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852 (2)
(Supp. 1968) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(3) (B) (Supp. 1967); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, §
755.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968) ; Ind. Ins. Dep't, Bull. No. 21, Aug. 22, 1966; H. Bill No.
1116, § 2, 1967 Kan. Laws; Md. Ann. Code art. 48A, § 240B (Supp. 1967) ; Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 72A.142 (Supp. 1968); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 379.202(1) (Supp. 1967) ; N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 20-310 (1965); N.D. Cent. Code § 26-02-33 (Supp. 1967); R.I. Ins. Reg., Aug. 15,
1962; S.C. Code Ann. § 46-750.51 (Supp. 1967); H. Bill No. 684, § 2(B), 1968 S.D.
Laws; Va. Code Ann. § 38.1-70.9 (Supp. 1968) ; Wash. Rev. Code § 48.18.-12. (Supp.
1967); W. Va. Code Ann. § 33-6A-1 (Supp. 1968).
74 Cal. Dep't of Ins., Ruling No. 147, File No. RH-108, at 4, Jan. 7, 1966.
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The major emphasis of the statutes is the detailing of reasons for which
insurance companies may cance1.75 These reasons are related to normal
underwriting standards and are clearly based on reliable statistics. While
grounds vary considerably from state to state, they may be placed in the
following categories: (1) nonpayment of premiums,76 (2) failure to possess
a valid operator's license," (3) material misrepresentation," (4) failure to
75 Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2371 (1965) ; Conn. Ad. Regs. § 38-175a-8
(1968) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852(2) (Supp. 1968) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(3) (C)
(Supp. 1967) ; III. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968) ; Ind. Ins. Dep't,
Bull. No. 21, Aug. 22, 1966; H. Bill No. 1116, § 2, 1467 Kan. Laws; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§
24.13021, 24.13220 (Supp. 1968) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.142 (Supp. 1968); Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 379.202(1) (Supp. 1967) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-310 (1965); R.I. Ins. Reg., Aug.
15, 1962; S.C. Code Ann. § 46-750.51 (Supp. 1967); H. Bill N. 684, § 2(A), 1968 S.D.
Laws; Wash. Rev. Code § 48.18.-12. (Supp. 1967) ; W. Va. Code Ann. § 33-6A-1 (Supp.
1968).
The Maryland, North Dakota and Virginia acts demand that the insured be told
the reason for cancellation, but they place absolutely no restrictions on what grounds
are permissible. Md. Code Ann. art. 48A, §§ 240A, 240B (Supp. 1967) ; N.D. Cent. Code
§ 26-02-32 to -36 (Supp. 1967); Va. Code Ann. §§ 38.1-70.9 to .13 (Supp. 1968). Thus,
the insurance company may act as whimsically as it desires so long as it tells the insured
and does not break any other substantive law.
The Massachusetts board of appeal on motor vehicle liability policies and bonds,
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 26, § 8A (1966), examines each case on its own facts, and
has no absolute standards governing permissible grounds for cancellation. However, the
following are the most common reasons for which the board allows cancellation; acci-
dent frequency, false answers in applications, nonpayment of premium, improper operator,
improper operation, noncooperation, illegal registration, unsafe motor vehicle circum-
stances surrounding accident. List of reasons prepared by Massachusetts board of appeal
on motor vehicle liability policies and bonds, Mar. 22, 1968.
The Wisconsin provision, while supplying the insured with notice and the right to
obtain the reason for termination, does not restrict the grounds for cancellation, unless
it is solely because of the age, residence, race, color, creed, national origin, ancestry or
occupation of anyone who is an insured. Ch. 337, § 204.341, 1967 Wis. Laws (Wis. Leg.
Serv. 1028 (1967)).
76 Cal. Ins. Code § 664 (West Supp. 1967) ; Conn. Ad. Regs. § 38-175a-8 (1968)
(or any installment whether payable directly to insurer or indirectly under any premium
finance plan or extension of credit) ; Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 2908 (1953); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 627.0852(2) (a) (Supp. 1968) (or installment whether payable directly or indirectly) ;
Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(3) (C) (a) (Supp. 1967) (or installment whether payable
directly or indirectly) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968) ; Ind.
Ins. Dep't, Bull. No. 21, Aug. 22, 1966 (or installment whether payable directly or
indirectly); H. Bill No. 1116, § 2(1), 1967 Kan. Laws (or installment whether payable
directly or indirectly) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13212 (Supp. 1968); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 72A.142 (Supp. 1968) (or installment whether payable directly or indirectly) ; Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 379.202(1) (1)(e) (Supp. 1967); N.C. Gen. St4. § 20-310 (1965) (or
installment); R.I. Ins. Reg., Aug. 15, 1962 (or installment) ; S.C. Code Ann. § 46-750.51
(Supp. 1967) (or installment) ; H. Bill No. 684, § 2(A), 1968 S.D. Laws (or installment
whether payable directly or indirectly; Wash. Rev. Code § 48.18.-12. (Supp. 1967) (or
installment) ; W. Va. Code § 33-6A-1 (Supp. 1968) (or installment).
77 There are two different reasons within this category.
First, where the named insured or any operator, either resident in the same house-
hold, or who customarily operates an automobile insured under the policy, has had his
driver's license suspended or revoked during the policy period. Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10,
art. 7.5., § 2371 (1965) ; Conn. Ad. Regs. § 38-175a-8 (1968) (or is convicted of driving
without having a driver's license); Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 2908 (1953) (the insured
is not licensed to operate a motor vehicle under the laws of the State); Fla. Stat. Ann.
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§ 627.0852(2)(e) (1) (Supp. 1968) (during the 36 months prior to the notice of
cancellation) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(3) (C) (g) (1) (Supp. 1967) (during the 36
months prior to notice) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968)
(during the 12 months prior to notice) ; Ind. Ins. Dep't, Bull. No. 21, Aug. 22, 1966; H.
Bill No. 1116, § 2(4)(a), 1967 Kan. Laws; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13220 (Supp. 1968)
(and the revocation or suspension has become final) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.142 (Supp.
1968) (during the 36 months prior to notice) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 379.202(1) (2) (a)
(Supp 1967) (or the insured has knowingly allowed another person to operate the
insured vehicle who is known to him to have had his driver's license suspended or
revoked during the policy period) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-310 (1965) (for more than
30 days) ; R.I. Ins. Reg., Aug. 15, 1962; S.C. Code Ann. § 46-750.51 (Supp. 1967) ; H.
Bill No. 684, § 2(A) (b), 1968 S.D. Laws (or motor vehicle registration during the
policy period or, if the polity is a renewal, during its policy period or the 180 days
immediately preceding its effective date) ; Wash. Rev. Code § 48.18.-[2. (Supp. 1967) ;
W. Va. Code § 33-6A-1 (Supp. 1968).
Second, where the named insured or any operator, either resident in the same
household, or who customarily operates an automobile insured under the policy, has
within 36 months prior to notice of cancellation operated a motor vehicle during the
period of revocation or suspension of operator's license on more than one occasion. Cal.
Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., .§ 2371 (1965) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 379.202(1) (2) (f)
(Supp. 1967).
78
 There are five reasons within the category.
First, the policy was obtained through a material misrepresentation. Cal. Ad. Code
ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2371 (1965) ; Conn. Ad. Regs. § 38-175a-8 (1967) (fraudulent
misrepresentation) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. 627.0852(2)(b) (Supp. 1968) ; Ga. Code Ann.
§ 56-2430(3) (C) (b) (Supp. 1967) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1968) ; Ind. Ins. Dep't, Bull. No. 21, Aug. 22, 1966 (fraudulent) ; H. Bill No. 1116, § 2(2),
1967 Kan. Laws (fraudulent) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.142 (Supp. 1967) ; Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 379.202(1)(1)(a) (Supp. 1967) (fraud or material misrepresentation).; R.I. Ins,
Reg., Aug. 15, 1962 (fraudulent) ; S.C. Code Ann. § 46-750.51 (Supp. 1967) ; Wash. Rev.
Code § 48.18.-[2. (Supp. 1967) (fraudulent) ; W. Va. Code § 33-6A-1 (Supp. 1968).
Second, willful failure by the named insured to disclose fully in his application
his record of accidents or traffic violations as are material to the insurer's acceptance
of the risk. Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2371 (1965) ; Ga. Code Ann.
§ 56-2430(3) (C) (d) (Supp. 1967) (if called for in the application, record for preceding
36 months) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755,3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968) (if called for in
the application, record for preceding 36 months) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13220 (Supp.
1968) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.142 (Supp. 1968) (if called for in application, record for
preceding 36 months) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 379.202(1) (1) (c) (Supp. 1967) ("serious" motor
vehicle accidents).
Third, failure by the named insured to disclose, in a written application or in
response to a direct oral inquiry by the insurer or an agent or broker, information
needed for the proper rating of the risk. Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, fit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2371
(1965) (willful failure to disclose) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(3) (C) (e) (Supp. 1967)
(acceptance or proper rating of the risk) ; Ili. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.3 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1968) (acceptance or proper rating) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13220 (Supp. 1968)
(acceptance or proper rating) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.142 (Supp. 1968) (acceptance or
proper rating).
Fourth, the insured does not reside at the address specified in the policy and
fails to furnish the correct address to the insured within a reasonable period. Cal. Ad.
Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2371 (1965) (at the insurer's request) ; Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 24.13220 (Supp. 1968).
Fifth, making a false or fraudulent claim, or knowingly aiding or abetting another
in the presentation of such a claim. Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2371 (1965) ;
FIa. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852 (2) (d) (Supp. 1968) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(3) (C) (f)
(Supp. 1967); III. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968) ; Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 24.13220 (Supp. 1968) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.142 (Supp. 1968) ; Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 379.202(1) (1) (d) (Supp. 1967).
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abide by the terms and conditions of the policy, 79 (5) poor health or excessive
use of alcohol or drug s, 80
 (6) criminal record," (7) ownership of mechanic-
79
 There are two reasons in this category.
First, violation by an insured of any of the terms and conditions of the policy. Cal.
Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2371 (1965) ; Conn. Ad. Regs. § 38-175a-8 (1967) ;
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852(2) (c) (Supp. 1968) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(3) (C) (c)
(Supp. 1967) ; III. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968) ; Ind. Ins. Dep't,
Bull. No. 21, Aug. 22, 1966; H. Bill No. 1116, § 2(3), 1967 Kan. Laws; Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 24.13220 (Supp. 1968) (the nature of which terms or conditions are material to the
risk being covered by the policy of insurance) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 379.202(1)(1)(b)
(Supp. 1967); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-310 (1965) (terms or conditions not in conflict with
the provisions of this subsection) ; R.I. Ins. Reg., Aug. 15, 1962; S.C. Code Ann.
§ 46-750.51 (Supp. 1967); Wash. Rev. Code § 48.18.-12. (Supp. 1967) (not in conflict
with this subsection) ; W. Va. Code § 33-6A-1 (Supp. 1968) (material terms and condi-
tions).
Second, named insured knowingly failed to give any required written notice of loss or
notice of lawsuit commenced against him, or, when requested, refused to cooperate in the
investigation of a claim or defense of a lawsuit. Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 2908 (1953)
(has failed or refused to cooperate as stated in the policy); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A-142
(Supp. 1968).
ao There are five reasons in the category relating to theinsured's health. Where the
named insured or any operator, either resident in the same household, or who cus-
tomarily operates an automobile insured under the policy:
(a) Is or becomes subject to epilepsy or heart attacks and cannot produce a doctor's
certificate as to his unqualified ability to operate a motor vehicle. Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5,
tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2371 (1965) ; Conn. Ad. Regs. § 38-175a-8 (1968) ; Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 627.0852 (2) (e) (2) (Supp. 1968); Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(3) (C) (g) (2) (Supp. 1967);
Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968; Ind. Ins. Dep't, Bull. No. 21, Aug.
22, 1966; H. Bill No. 1116, § 2(4) (b), 1967 Kan. Laws; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13220 (Supp.
1968) (or has a major mental or physical disability and cannot produce a physician's
certificate) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.142 (Supp. 1968) (such physician's opinion to be
based on reasonable medical probability); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 379.202(1) (2) (b) (Supp.
1967); R.I. Ins. Reg., Aug. 15, 1962; S.C. Code Ann. § 46-750.51 (Supp. 1967); Wash.
Rev. Code § 48.18.-12. (Supp. 1967) (is likely to experience); W. Va. Code § 33-6A-1
(Supp. 1968).
(b) Has an accident record, conviction record (criminal or traffic), physical, mental,
or other conditions, which considered as a whole are such that this operation of an auto-
mobile would endanger the public safety. Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2371
(1965); Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 2908 (1953) (mental or physical infirmities or dis-
abilities rendering it unsafe for him to operate a motor vehicle) ; Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 627.0852 (2) (e) (3) (Supp. 1968); Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(3) (C) (g) (3) (Supp.
1967); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968); Mich. Stat. Ann.
424.13220 (Supp. 1968) (or which would be grounds for suspension of his license) ;
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.142 (Supp. 1968); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 379.202(1)(2)(c) (Supp.
1967).
(c) Has within 36 months prior to notice of cancellation been addicted to the use of
narcotic or other drugs. Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2371 (1965) (provided
the insurer has reasonable information before cancelling) ; Del. Code Ann. fit. 21, § 2908
(1953); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852(2) (e) (4) (Supp. 1968); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 56-2430(3) (C) (g) (4) (Supp. 1967) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp,
1968; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13220 (Supp. 1968) (which can be medically substantiated) ;
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 379.202(1)(2)(d) (Supp. 1967) (provided the insurer has reasonable
information before cancelling).
(d) Habitually uses alcoholic beverages to excess. Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art.
7.5., § 2371 (1965) (provided the insurer has reasonable information before cancelling) ;
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852 (2) (e) (5) (Supp. 1968); Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(3) (C) (g) (5)
(Supp. 1967); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, 4 755.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968); Mich. Stat.
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Ann. § 24.13220 (Supp. 1968) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 379.202(1) (2) (e) (Supp. 1967)
(provided the insurer has reasonable information before cancelling).
(e) Policy shall not be cancelled solely because of age. H. Bill No. 1116, § 2, 1967
Kan. Laws; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13021 (Supp. 1968) (solely because insured reaches
age 65 if he still has a valid operator's license) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-310.2 (Supp. 5
1967) (renewal) ; ch. 337, § 204.341, 1967 Wis. Laws (Wis. Leg. Serv. 1028 (1967))
(solely because of the age, residence, race, color, creed, national origin, ancestry or occupa-
tion of insured).
Ea In the category, criminal record of an insured, are nine different reasons per-
mitting cancellation. Where the named insured or any other operator who customarily
operates an automobile insured under the policy is or has been convicted of or forfeits
bail during the 36 months immediately preceding the notice of cancellation for:
(a) Any felony. Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2371 (1965); Conn. Ad.
Regs. § 38-175a-8 (1968) ; FIa. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852(2) (e) (6) (a) (Supp. 1968) ; Ga.
Code Ann. § 56-2430(3) (C) (g) (6) (a) (Supp. 1967) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.3
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968) ; Ind. Ins. Dep't, Bull. No. 21, Aug. 22, 1966; H. Bill No. 1116,
§ 2(4) (C) (1), 1967 Kan. Laws; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 379.202(1) (3) (a) (Supp. 1967) ; N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 20-310 (1965) (during the policy period) ; R.I. Ins. Reg., Aug. 15, 1962; S.C.
Code Ann. § 46-750.51 (Supp. 1967) ; Wash. Rev. Code § 48.18.-[2. (Supp. 1967) ; W. Va.
Code § 33-6A-1 (Supp. 1968) (during the policy period and statute may be construed
to require felony to involve the use of a motor vehicle).
(b) Criminal negligence resulting in death, homicide or assault arising out of the
operation of a motor vehicle. Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2371 (1965) ; Conn.
Ad. Regs. § 38-175a-8 (1968) ; FIa. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852(2)(e) (6)(b) (Supp. 1968) ;
Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(3) (C) (g) (6) (b) (Supp.
 1967) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.3
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968) ; Ind. Ins. Dep't, Bull. No. 21, Aug. 22, 1966; H. Bill No. 1116,
§ 2 (4) (c) (2), 1967 Kan. Laws; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13220 (Supp. 1968) ; Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 72A.142 (Supp. 1968) (24 months—criminal negligence or assault) ; Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 379.202(1) (3) (b) (Supp. 1967) ; R.I. Ins. Reg., Aug. 15, 1962; S.C. Code Ann.
§ 46-750.51 (Supp. 1967) ; Wash. Rev. Code § 48.18.-12. (Supp. 1967); W. Va. Code §
33-6A-1 (Supp. 1968) (during the policy period—negligent homicide).
(c) Operating a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition, or while under the
influence of drugs. Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2371 (1965) ; Conn. Ad. Regs.
§ 38-175a-8 (1968); FIa. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852(2) (e) (6) (c) (Supp. 1968) ; Ga. Code
Ann. § 56-2430(3) (C) (g) (6) (c) (Supp. 1967) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.3 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1968) ; Ind. Ins. Dep't, Bull. No. 21, Aug. 22, 1966; H. Bill No. 1116, §
2(4) (c) (3), 1967 Kan. Laws; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13220 (Supp. 1968) ; Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 72A.142 (Supp. 1968) (24 months) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 379.202(1)(3)(c) (Supp.
1967) ; R.I. Ins. Reg., Aug. 15, 1962; S.C. Code Ann. § 46-750.51 (Supp. 1967) ; Wash.
Rev. Code § 48.18.42. (Supp. 1967) ; W. Va. Code § 33-6A-1 (Supp. 1968) (during the
policy period).
(d) Being intoxicated while in or about an automobile or while having custody of
an automobile. Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2371 (1965) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. §
627.0852 (2) (e) (6) (d) (Supp. 1968) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(3) (C) (g) (6) (d) (Supp.
1967) ; III. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968).
(e) Leaving the scene of an accident without stopping to report. Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5,
tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2371 (1965) ; Conn. Ad. Regs. § 38-175a-8 (1968) ; Fla Stat. Ann.
§ 627.0852(2) (e) (6) (e) (Supp. 1968) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(3) (C) (g) (6) (e) (Supp.
1967) ; III. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968) ; Ind. Ins. Dep't, Bull.
No. 21, Aug. 22, 1966; H. Bill No. 1116, § 2(4)(c) (4), 1967 Kan. Laws; Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 24.13220 (Supp. 1968) (knowingly) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.142 (Supp. 1968) ;
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 379.202(1)(3) (d) (Supp. 1967) ; R.I. Ins. Reg., Aug. 15, 1962; S.C.
Code Ann. § 46-750.51 (Supp. 1967) ; Wash. Rev. Code § 48.18.42. (Supp. 1967) ; W. Va.
Code § 33-6A-1 (Supp. 1968) (during the policy period, and the accident must be one in
which the insured is involved).
(f) Theft or unlawful taking of a vehicle. Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. I0, art. 7.5., §
2371 (1965) ; Conn. Ad. Regs. § 38-175a-8 (1968) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852(2) (e) (6) (f)
(Supp. 1968); Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(3) (C) (g) (6) (f) (Supp. 1967); Ill. Ann. Stat.
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ally defective vehicle or one used in hazardous activities. 82
ch. 73, § 755.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968) ; Ind. Ins. Dcp't, Bull. No. 21, Aug. 22, 1966;
H. Bill No. 1116, § 2(4) (c) (5), 1967 Kan. Laws; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13220 (Supp.
1968); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.142 (Supp. 1968) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-310 (1965)
(during the policy period); R.I. Ins. Reg., Aug. 15, 1962; S.C. Code Ann. § 46-750.51
(Supp. 1967) ; Wash. Rev. Code § 48.18.42. (Supp. 1967) ; W. Va. Code § 33-6A-1
(Supp. 1968) (during the policy period).
(g) Making false statements in an application for a driver's license. Cal. Ad. Code
ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2371 (1965) ; Conn. Ad. Regs. § 38-175a-8 (1968) ; Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 627.0852(2) (e) (6) (g) (Supp. 1968) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(3) (C) (g) (6) (g)
(Supp. 1967) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967) (or chauffeur's
license); Ind. Ins. Dept, Bull. No. 21, Aug. 22, 1966; H. Bill No. 1116 § 2(4) (c) (6), 1967
Kan. Laws; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13220 (Supp. 1968) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72) 2 .142 (Supp.
1968); R.I. Ins. Reg., Aug. 15, 1962; S.C. Code Ann. § 46-750.51 (Supp. 1967) ; W. Va.
Code § 33-6A-1 (Supp. 1968) (during the policy period).
(h) Operation of any motor vehicle during the period of suspension or revocation
of an operator's license. Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2371 (1965) ; Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 379.202(1) (3) (e) (Supp. 1967).
(i) Three or more violations of any law of any state limiting the speed of motor
vehicles, the violation of which constitutes a misdemeanor, or moving traffic violation,
whether or not the violations were repetitious of the same offense or were different. Cal.
Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2371 (1965) (18 months, equipment violations while
operating a commercial vehicle are not to be counted) ; Conn. Ad. Regs. § 38-175a-8
(1968) (18 months) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852(2) (e) (7) (Supp. 1968) (36 months);
Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(3) (C) (g) (7) (Supp. 1967) (36 months); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73,
§ 755.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968) (12 months); Ind. Ins. Dep't, Bull. No. 21, Aug. 22,
1966 (18 months); H. Bill No. 1116, § 2(4) (c) (7), 1967 Kan. Laws (18 months) ;
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.142 (Supp. 1968) (18 months, one violation which would justify
revocation of a driver's license); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 379.202(1)(4) (Supp. 1967) (18
months; but equipment violations while operating a commercial vehicle are not to be
counted); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-310 (1965) (18 months, any moving violation) ; R.I. Ins.
Reg., Aug. 15, 1962 (18 months); S.C. Code Ann. § 46-750.51 (Supp. 1967) (18 months);
Wash. Rev. Code § 48.18.42. (Supp. 1967) (18 months, any moving traffic offense); W.
Va. Code § 33-6A-1 (Supp. 1968) (12 months, any moving traffic violation which con-
stitutes a misdemeanor).
82 The category relating to the condition and use of the insured's automobile con-
tains seven different reasons permitting cancellation. Where an insured automobile is:
(a) So defective mechanically as to endanger public safety. Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit.
10, art. 7.5. § 2371 (1965) (driving the automobile in the condition must constitute a
misdemeanor) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852(2)(f) (1) (Supp. 1968) ; Ga. Code Ann. §
56-2430(3) (C) (g) (8) (a) (Supp. 1967); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1968); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13220 (Supp. 1968) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.142 (Supp.
1968); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 379.202(1)(5)(a) (Supp. 1967) (driving the automobile in the
condition must constitute a misdemeanor).
(b) Used for carrying passengers for hire or compensation (car pool use not to be
so considered). Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2371 (1965) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. §
627.0852(2) (f) (2) (Supp. 1968); Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(3) (C) (g) (8) (b) (Supp.
1967); 111. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. §
24.13220 (Supp. 1968) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.142 (Supp. 1968) ; Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 379.202(1) (5) (b) (Supp. 1967).
(c) Used in the transportation of flammables or explosives. Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit.
10, art. 7.5., § 2371 (1965); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852(2) (f) (3) (Supp. 1968); Ga.
Code Ann. § 56-2430(3) (C) (g) (8) (c) (Supp. 1967) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.3
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13220 (Supp. 1968); Minn. Stat. Ann.
72A.142 (Supp. 1968) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 379.202(1) (5) (c) (Supp. 1967) (repeatedly
used).
(d) An authorized emergency vehicle. Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2371
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The most significant protection afforded by the statutes is that the
insurance company cannot cancel when the insured has an accident or makes
a claim.83
 None of the statutes explicitly allow cancellation because of fre-
quent accidents. Seven states sanction cancellation, however, if the insured
has an accident record which is such that his operation of an automobile
might endanger public safety. 84
 These provisions are sweeping in their lan-
guage and could be interpreted to allow cancellation because of accident
frequency. Cancellation of an insured for an accident record which indicates
that his operation of an automobile might endanger public safety presumably
will not frustrate the purposes of the statutes.
There are, nevertheless, some pitfalls and weaknesses in the statutory
grounds. A distinction must be made between conditions that arise during the
policy period and conditions that existed prior to the inception of the policy
period. Since all statutes allow the company 55 or 60 days to conduct an
underwriting investigation, there is no need to permit companies to cancel
during the policy period for reasons relating to matters that were or should
have been disclosed by the investigation. Yet, many of the permitted grounds
fall within this category. 85
 As a result many insureds are denied protection
(1965) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852(2) (f) (4) (Supp. 1968); Ga. Code Ann. § 56.2430-
(3)(C)(g) (8) (d) (Supp. 1967); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1968); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13220 (Supp. 1968); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.142 (Supp.
1968) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 379.202(1)(5) (d) (Supp. 1967) (repeatedly used).
(e) Substantially changed in type or condition during the policy period substantially
increasing the risk. Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2371 (1965) (such as, con-
version to a commercial type vehicle, a dragster, sports car, or so as to give clear evidence
of a use other than the original use) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852(2) (f) (5) (Supp. 1968);
Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(3) (C) (g) (8) (e) .. (Supp. 1967) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, .§ 755.3
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13220 (Supp. 1968) ; Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 72A.142 (Supp. 1968) (such as, conversion to a commercial type vehicle, a dragster, a
sports car, or so as to give clear evidence of a use other than the original use) ; Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 379.202(1) (5) (e) (Supp. 1967) (such as, conversion to a commercial type vehicle,
a dragster, a sports car, or so as to give clear evidence of a use other than the original
use).
(f) Subject to an inspection law and has not been inspected or, if inspected, has
failed to qualify. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852(2)(f)(6) (Supp. 1968) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch.
73, § 755.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.142 (Supp. 1968).
(g) No insurer shall cancel, or refuse to renew a policy of any peace officer on his
private automobile due to his accident rate compiled while driving police automobiles
in pursuit of his duties. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13262 (Supp. 1968).
83 One survey indicates that accident frequency and motor vehicle violations con-
stitute the principal reason for termination of policies. See Kentucky Legislative Research
Commission, Insurance: Cancellation and Nonrenewal of Private Passenger Automobile
Coverages 65, 67 (1967).
84 Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2371 (1965) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852-
(2)(e)(3) (Supp. 1968); Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(3) (C) (g) (3) (Supp. 1967); Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13220 (Supp.
1968) ("or which would be grounds for the suspension of his license." This indicates a
type of severity intended by the legislature, and should help avoid frivolous arguments
by the insurer); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.142 (Supp. 1968); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 379.202-
(1)(2)(c) (Supp. 1967).
85 1. The insurance was obtained through a material misrepresentation. 2. The
insured failed to disclose in written application or in response to inquiry by his broker
or by the insurer or its agent information necessary for the acceptance or proper rating
of the risk. 3. The insured or any other operator who customarily operates the insured
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by the statutes, since at any moment the company may terminate, relying on
information known prior to the acceptance of the risk. While they no doubt
present unfavorable risks, if the company decides that the risk is neverthe-
less acceptable, then the insureds should not be subject to the peril of
instantaneous cancellation, To correct this flaw, either subsequent termina-
tion statutes should not permit cancellation or refusal to renew for grounds
presumably disclosed by investigation, or courts should imply a condition
that cancellation be based only on information not available during the 55
or 60 day period of investigation.
If the weaknesses of the statutes are to be overcome and the practices
which brought about the need for the statutes eliminated, the permitted
reasons for cancellation must be construed properly. Insignificant defects,
though within the letter of the law, should not be sufficient grounds for can-
cellation. One late payment on the installment of the premium or a failure
to comply with the conditions of the policy (for example, failure to give
notice of change of address within the specified number of days), probably
occurs during the policy period of many insureds who do not present ab-
normal risks, yet these defects could be construed to warrant cancellation.
It is submitted that such a literal construction of the statutes would protect
no one, and would thus frustrate the objectives of the statutes. The respons-
ibility is on state insurance commissioners to develop guidelines consistent
with the purpose of the legislation," and on state courts to interpret the
provisions in light of the legislative policy. Thus far, there has been a varied
response from the commissioners. On the one hand, the Florida Commissioner
recognized that some of the permitted reasons were relatively broad and,
therefore, declared that the policy holder will receive the benefit of any
doubt in any hearing." On the other hand, the West Virginia Commissioner
has said that the companies need not change their policy forms to comply
with the statute until the companies have submitted a new revision of their
forms.88
As mentioned above, all cancellation statutes reguire that notice of
cancellation be given to the insured and, in some states, to the motor vehicle
department, a set period before the effective date of cancellation, though in
some states the notice period is reduced or notice is not necessary if the
reason for cancellation is nonpayment of premium." The statutes vary con-
automobile has, within a certain period of time prior to the policy period, had his driver's
license suspended or revoked. 4. The insured has an accident record, conviction record
(criminal or traffic), physical, mental, or other condition which is such that his operation
of an automobile might endanger the public safety. 5. The insured has within the last
36 months been addicted to narcotics or other drugs. 6. The insured uses alcoholic bev-
erages to excess. 7. All reasons relating to his criminal record.
88 The commissioners should have this authority either by virtue of a specific pro-
vision in the cancellation statute, e.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13260 (Supp, 1968), or by
a general enabling statute, e.g., (la. Code Ann. § 56-216 (1960).
87 Florida Treasurer's Office, Directive Private Passenger Automobile Liability Insur-
ance Cancellation Law, Aug. 7, 1967.
88 Frank R. Montgomery, W. Va, Ins. Comm'r, Letter to all Licensed Fire and
Casualty Insurance Companies, Apr. 7, 1967.
81) Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852(3) (a) (Supp. 1968) (10 instead of 20 days notice
must be given if reason is nonpayment of premium); Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(4) (Supp.
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siderably, however, in their requirements of what the notice must contain.
Some states require that the notice include the reasons for cancellation." A
few states require that reasons be furnished only if a written request is made
by the insured." The former seems preferable since it immediately informs
the insured of the basis of the company's decision, thus obviating the neces-
sity of further correspondence, and enabling the insured to decide whether to
pursue any rights he may have. A middle course, however, has been adopted
by many states which require the company to inform the insured in the
notice of cancellation of his right to request and receive the reasons for
cancellation."
Courts may require the company's reason to be very specific. In a recent
Massachusetts case," the defendant insurance company sent a notice of
cancellation to an insured, giving as its reason "Misstatements in application
to Question 8A." Subsequently, the plaintiffs were injured as a result of a
collision with the vehicle driven by the insured. The company denied liability
on the policy. However, the court held that "Misstatements in application
to Question 8A" was not a "specific" reason within the statute, and so the
cancellation was invalid and the plaintiffs recovered judgments from the
company.94 The company's reason did not inform the insured of the sub-
stance of question 8A, of the nature of the misstatements, or whether the
question was included in the application for registration or for insurance.
The court emphasized that, had adequate notice been given, the insured might
1967) (10 instead of 20 days); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968)
(10 instead of 20 days); Md. Ann. Code art. 48A, § 240A (Supp. 1967) (no notice
required) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.143 (Supp. 1968) (10 instead of 30 days); N.D.
Cent. Code § 26-02-33 (Supp. 1967) (no notice required) ; H. Bill No. 684, § 3, 1968
S.D. Laws (10 instead of 20 days) ; Va. Code Ann. § 38.1-70.9 (Supp. 1968) (no notice
required) ; ch. 337, § 204.341, 1967 Wis. Laws (Wis. Leg. Serv. 1028 (1967)) (no
notice required).
90 Cal. Ins. Code § 653 (West Supp. 1967) ; Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., §
2373 (1965) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13224 (Supp. 1968) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.143
(Supp. 1968); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-310 (1965).
91
 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 379.202(3)(1) (Supp. 1967) (reasons must be sent within 30
days after request) ; S.C. Code Ann. § 46-750.53 (Supp. 1967) (reasons must be sent
within 45 days after request); W. Va. Code Ann. § 33-6A-3 (Supp. 1968) (reasons must
be sent within 30 days after request).
92 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852(3)(a) (Supp. 1968) (request by insured must be made
not less than 15 days prior to effective date of termination, and the reasons must be
sent within 5 days after insured's request) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(4) (Supp. 1967)
(request 15 days prior to effective date, reasons sent within 5 days); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch.
73, § 755.4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968) (request 15 days prior to effective date, reasons
sent within 5 days); Kan. Ins. Dep't, Reg. No. 40-3-31 (letter from W. Fletcher Bell,
Ass't Comm'r of Ins., Apr. 5, 1968); Md. Ann. Code art. 48A, § 240B (Supp.
1967) ; N.D. Cent. Code § 26-02-33 (Supp. 1967) (request 10 days prior to effective
date); H. Bill No. 684, § 3, 1968 S.D. Laws; Va. Code Ann. § 38.1-70.9 (Supp. 1968);
Wash. Rev. Code § 48.18.42. (Supp. 1967) (request must be made within .5 days after
receipt of notice) ; ch. 337, § 204.341, 1967 Wis. Laws (Wis. Leg. Serv. 1028 (1967))
(request must be made before effective date, and reasons must be sent within 5 days
after request).
93 Fields v. Parsons, 1968 Mass. Adv. Sh. 331, 234 N.E.2d 744 (1968).
94 M. at 332, 234 N.E.2d at 745.
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have been able to prevent the cancellation, or have been able to obtain a new
policy of insurance elsewhere 9a
To insure full and complete disclosure of information, most states pro-
vide absolute immunity from suit based on any statements or information
released by the company." Insurers,/ for aid in evaluating risks, rely upon
information collected from a variety of sources. 9' This information may be
personal and, as a result, its disclosure would subject the insurer to a suit
for defamation." The immunity provision removes any objections the com-
pany might have about providing the reasons for cancellation with the
notice of cancellation.
In the event the insured believes that the company has not complied
with the statutory requirements and wishes to contest cancellation, the
statutes of several states have provided him with a right to a hearing before
the commissioner of insurance.99
 Some states, in an effort to make the insured
aware of the alternatives available to him, insist that the notice of cancella-
tion inform the insured of his right to appeal."° As an additional help to
the insured, the notice of cancellation must specify the procedure he will
need to follow to obtain review of the company's action."' Furthermore,
many states require the company to inform the insured of his possible eligi-
bility for insurance through the automobile assigned-risk program.102
95 Id.
99 Cal. Ins. Code § 663 (West Supp. 1967) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852(11) (Supp.
1968); Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2430(9) (Supp. 1967); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.9 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1968) ; H. Bill No. 1116, § 5, 1967 Kan. Laws; Md. Ann, Code art. 48A,
§ 240B (Supp. 1967) (privileged if good faith); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13250 (Supp.
1968) (or commissioner); Minn. Stat, Ann. § 72A.147 (Supp. 1968) (or commissioner) ;
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 379.202(3) (2) (Supp. 1967) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-310 (1965) (priv-
ileged and no cause of action shall arise) ; N.D. Cent. Code § 26-02-35 (Supp. 1967)
(if good faith); S.C. Code Ann. § 46-750.53 (Supp. 1967) (between company and
insured, disclosure of reasons is privileged communication and company shall have
defense of qualified privilege); H. Bill No. 684, § 8, 1968 S.D. Laws; Va. Code Ann. §
38.1-70.11 (Supp. 1968) (if good faith); Wash. Rev. Code § 48.18.-[2. (Supp. 1967)
(if good faith) ; W. Va. Code § 33-6A-3 (Supp. 1968) (if statements made with probable
cause) ; ch. 337, § 204.341, 1967 Wis. Laws (Wis. Leg. Serv. 1028 (1967)). There is no
provision for immunity in Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts and Rhode Island.
97 H.R. Rep. No. 815, supra note 68, at 94.
98 See id. at 95.
91) Cal. Ins. Code § 662 (West Supp. 1967) ; Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., §
2372 (1965) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852(9) (Supp. 1968) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73,
§ 755.10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175, § 113D (Supp.
1966); Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 24.13230-44, .13254 (Supp. 1968) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. §
72A.148 (Supp. 1968) ; W. Va. Code § 33-6A-5 (Supp. 1968).
100 Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2373 (1965) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852-
(12) (Supp. 1968) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968) (except if
reason is nonpayment of premium); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13224 (Supp. 1968) ; Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 72A.146 (Supp. 1968).
101 Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2373 (1965); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852-
(12) (Supp. 1968).
102 Cal. Ins. Code § 652 (West Supp. 1967) (unless cancellation is for nonpayment
of premium, or policy is an assigned-risk policy) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852(6) (Supp.
1968) (unless the reason for cancellation is nonpayment of premium); Ga. Code Ann. §
56-2430(7) (Supp. 1967) (unless reason is nonpayment of premium); III. Ann. Stat. ch.
73, § 755.7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968); H. Bill No. 1116, § 3, 1967 Kan. Laws; Md. Ann.
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After a hearing the commissioner may affirm or uphold the cancellation
if he finds that the company complied with the statutory requirements. If
the commissioner finds for the insured, however, he may order the notice of
cancellation to be withdrawn, or, if the date cancellation is to be effective has
elapsed, order the policy reinstated.' 03 n
For the insured to obtain a decision from the commissioner favorable
to himself may, however, prove difficult. Several states presume the cancella-
tion to be valid,'" and, in any event, the policy holder is the moving party
and, thus, must assume the burden of proof.'" If the insured is dissatisfied
with the results of the administrative hearing (or if the state does not provide
an administrative hearing) he may seek judicial review in the state's appro-
priate court. So long as he has first exhausted his administrative remedies,'"
judicial review should be available. 107
There are several possible judicial remedies available. Either an action
for a declaratory judgment or a suit for an injunction should help determine
the effectiveness of the company's cancellation, and the validity of the com-
missioner's decision. Both of these alternatives offer the advantage of im-
mediately settling the rights of the parties, thus avoiding a situation where
the insured does not know whether he is protected by insurance. Wrongful
cancellation could also be considered a breach of contract, with the company
liable for damages naturally flowing from the breach, including any increase
in premiums the insured had to pay to replace the coverage with another
company.'" Regarding the measure of damages, if the company did not
comply with the statutory requirements for cancellation, then the policy
would still be in effect, and the company would be liable for any claims
against the policy.m But whether the company's obligation to pay a claim
be considered as arising under the policy or as compensation for breach of
contract makes little difference. The company's obligation would be measured
by an identical standard.
Code art. 48A, § 240A (Supp. 1967) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.146 (Supp. 1968) ; H. Bill
No. 684, § 6, 1968 S.D. Laws; ch. 337, § 204.341, 1967 Wis. Laws (Wis. Leg. Serv.
1028 (1967)) (unless reason is nonpayment of premium).
103 Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2372 (1965) ; Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, §
2908 (1953) (Commissioner shall make such order as may be equitable and just) ; Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 627.0852(9) (c) (Supp. 1968) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.10 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1968) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175, § 1130 (Supp. 1966) (Board of Appeals shall
form an appropriate order) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. '§ 24.13244 (Supp. 1968) ; Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 72A.148 (Supp. 1968) (Commissioner shall approve or disapprove the insurer's
action) ; W. Va. Code § 33-6A-5 (Supp. 1968).
104 Cal. Ad. Code ch. 5, tit. 10, art. 7.5., § 2372 (1965) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.0852-
(8) (b) (Supp. 1968) ; M. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 755.10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968) .
1" Bauer v. Clark, 161 F.2d 397, 400 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 839 (1947),
rehearing denied, 332 U.S. 849 (1948).
lea See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
107 Some statutes specifically provide for judicial review of the Commissioner's
decision, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175, § 113D (Supp. 1966) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. §
24.13244 (Supp. 1968) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 72A.148 (Supp. 1968) ; W. Va. Code
§ 33-6A-5 (Supp. 1968).
108 See Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A.141 (1929).
109 Fields v. Parsons, 1968 Mass. Adv. Sh. 331, 234 N.E.2d 744 (1968). The South




Unfortunately, under the present cancellation statutes, the judicial rem-
edies for the insured who successfully appeals are severely limited by the
scope of the statutes themselves. While a court may coerce reinstatement of
the policy, by declaratory judgment or injunction, the effect is only tem-
porary. At the expiration of the policy the company can decline to renew for
the exact same reasons it originally cancelled. By assuming the initiative to
prove the company's capriciousness, the insured, if successful, is allowed to
retain his policy in force for the duration of the term.
As mentioned above, South Carolina has attempted to strengthen the pro-
tection. 1 " If the Department of Insurance finds that a refusal to renew was
not based on a generally accepted underwriting basis, then the refusal to
renew shall not affect the insurance rates of any policy subsequently applied
for with another company, and the insured need not disclose the refusal to
renew on a subsequent application."' Insurers rely on the services of com-
mercial inspection companies, and the failure to report previous action of an
insurer is of doubtful value, since the second company will be aware of the
prior cancellation and is thus able to use it in classifying the insured.
Recognizing this, the Insurance Law Study Committee of the South Car-
olina General Assembly has recommended that the statute be amended to
allow the Department of Insurance to disallow and set aside the refusal to
renew. 112
The problems of cancellation and nonrenewal do not appear to have
reached the proportions that would justify imposition of criminal sanctions,
nor does revocation or suspension of the power to write insurance seem
warranted. On the other hand, under the present system there may not be
incentive to appeal an unjustified cancellation, unless the accompanying
financial loss is serious or obtaining other insurance impossible.
The cancellation statutes represent an attempt at correction, but the at-
tempt will prove to be only a temporary relief. The direction of the future
has already been seen, both with the South Carolina renewal provision
and with those statutes which extend a three-month policy period to six or
twelve months. Regulation of mid-term cancellation will increase the number
of decisions by insurance companies not to renew policies; regulation of re-
newals will result in greater company selectivity in initial decisions to write
policies. Mid-term cancellation, refusal to renew, and failure to issue are
merely single representations of a larger problem. If the automobile liability
system were functioning properly, the tremors of total government regulation
of the area would not be felt.
ROBERT J. GLENNON, JR.
110 S.C. Code Ann. § 46-750.54 (Supp. 1967). See pp. 1006-07 supra.
111 Id .
112 Letter from Joe P. Barnett, Research Ass't, South Carolina Dep't of Ins., Feb.
26, 1968.
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